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A B S T R A C T   
For the last two decades, the Congolese Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector has been undergoing 
reforms of its governing structures. A recurrent argument supporting the reforms — predominantly in the 3T 
ASM sector (i.e. tin, tantalum and tungsten) — is that artisanal mining feeds violence (including sexual violence), 
conflicts, underdevelopment, and poverty. The reforms have been extensively studied, and academic research in 
turn has triggered empirical policy and advocacy researches. Researchers have found different outcomes and 
interpretations of the effectiveness of the reforms. This study consists of a systematic review of the findings 
gathered from the literature on the changing role of the state in governing 3T mining. It argues that in the study 
areas (i.e. North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Tanganyika), the challenges faced by the state in governing artisanal 
mining tend to be similar, complex, and rooted in the mining history of eastern DRC. Recent armed conflicts have 
only added new layers to existing challenges. In addressing these challenges and given their complexity, the state 
has succeeded in some areas but has failed in putting in place a coherent ‘model’ for governing the 3T ASM 
sector.   
1. Introduction 
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in the eastern Congo, espe-
cially the 3T1 sector, is undergoing profound reforms. A recurrent 
argument of the members of the international community supporting 
the reforms is that artisanal mining feeds violent conflict, underdevel-
opment and appalling poverty (Global Witness, 2009). This argument 
has given birth to the ‘conflict mineral’2 narrative, which needs to be 
reversed for a better image of the sector. Many researchers engaged in 
empirical policy and advocacy research have extensively studied the 
reforms. In the three provinces concerned by this literature review 
(Tanganyika, North-Kivu and South-Kivu), mining reforms have led to 
different outcomes and interpretations regarding their effectiveness 
(Bashwira, 2017; Cuvelier et al., 2014; Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015; 
Diemel and Hilhorst, 2018; Geenen, 2012; Wakenge, 2017). This study 
provides a systematic review of the literature on what have been the 
effects of the reforms in the 3T mining sector on the perceived gover-
nance capacity of the Congolese government. This study also includes a 
review of the evidence regarding the effects of formalization reforms on 
the position of women in the mines, i.e. how mining administration has 
addressed gender issues, especially regarding the inclusion or exclusion 
of women in ASM. In a sector where state-society power relations 
dominate daily life, it is necessary to understand the way state actors 
have been dealing differently with men and women when it comes to 
accountability. The lack of education is arguably a hindrance for many 
women because they are rarely aware (or made aware) of new laws or 
measures put in place. This makes women more disadvantaged than men 
when it comes to dealing with state officials in the ASM sector. 
Overall, mining reforms in the DRC had two major components: on 
the one hand, they involved a liberalization of the mining sector under 
the impetus of the World Bank, while, on the other hand, they also 
entailed a quest for greater transparency in mineral supply chains 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: bergh@iss.nl (S.I. Bergh), Jeroen.Cuvelier@UGent.be (J. Cuvelier).   
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through traceability schemes. Although, in this paper, we will mostly 
focus on the second component, it is important to note that – to a certain 
extent - the two components have been intertwined and driven by the 
same underlying rationale. From the early 2000s onwards, the dominant 
conviction among international policymakers was that the legislative 
framework governing the Congolese mining sector was in need of a 
thorough overhaul so as to bring it into closer alignment with the norms 
and standards of the (neoliberal) globalized mining economy (Vogel and 
Raeymaekers 2016; Mazalto 2005). 
After the official end of the Congolese war in 2003, the World Bank 
considered mining as a vital instrument for the country’s economic re-
covery, and it expected the private sector to play a leading role in this. 
Therefore, in order to attract new investors and to create a more stable 
business environment, the Bank pushed for the restructuring of Con-
golese mining parastatals, the preparation of a new mining registry, and 
- perhaps most importantly – the introduction of a new mining code in 
2002 (Mazalto 2005: 7–31; World Bank 2008), which was revised again 
in 2018. The new mining code, unlike the old one, incorporates a wide 
range of transparency measures in mining permits. It also contains 
measures to help prevent abuse along the mineral supply chains, if it can 
be properly implemented. It could also help provide and improve basic 
social services to communities living in and around mining areas and 
beyond. This new code also has the merit of addressing gender issues, 
though it only clarifies the limitation on work by pregnant women, 
which had already been criticized by authors such as Bashwira et al. 
(2014). 
With regard to the efforts to ensure greater transparency, the inter-
national community has taken many different initiatives that together 
aim to ensure a responsible mineral supply chain, including among 
others the due diligence schemes of the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), a certification mechanism of the 
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Tin 
Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) traceability system of the International 
Tin Research Institute (ITRI), now called ITA (International Tin Asso-
ciation) from 1st February 2018, which is the most significant initiative 
when it comes to certifying minerals as conflict-free.3 Monitored by ITA 
employees, iTSCi is implemented by Congolese state agents at 3T mining 
sites. In 2010, the US Congress passed the Dodd Frank Act of which 
section 1502 requires stock-listed companies in the US to provide spe-
cific assurances that any products that they have manufactured or 
contracted to manufacture do not contain minerals that directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the DRC or its neighbors 
(see Seay 2012). 
It is important to bear in mind that, following efforts to formalize 
mining, the state is only one actor among others. International actors 
and private corporations play a key role in technically and/or financially 
supporting the reforms. This observation suggests that the changes 
resulting from the reforms need to be understood as the outcome of the 
efforts of different state and non-state stakeholders. 
Extending from South-Kivu to Tanganyika and North-Kivu, mining 
reforms implemented at the 3T mines rely on two interdependent 
components. Before a mine is declared ‘yellow’, ‘red’ or ‘green’ (which 
means it becomes eligible for certification), a multi-stakeholder vali-
dation process is necessary. Validation of mining sites requires visits of a 
joint team composed by representatives of state agencies like Service 
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement des Mines Artisanales et à Petite Echelle 
(SAEMAPE),4 iTSCi (through an NGO called PACT), bilateral coopera-
tion, UN agencies, and civil society organizations. These teams assess the 
security situation at the mine and its surroundings, as well as socio- 
economic risks such as child labor, depth of pits, presence of pregnant 
women, and environmental issues. They classify sites as yellow, red or 
green depending on their observations, to decide whether a mine can be 
decreed ‘conflict-free’ (De Haan and Geenen, 2016: 823). Across the 
studied areas, two traceability mechanisms can be found, namely the 
iTSCi and Beta Sourcing Program (BSP). Designed by the International 
Tin Research Institute in 2009, iTSCi provides a means of determining 
the origin of 3T and documenting the trading chain for these minerals by 
‘tagging and bagging’5 the loads of 3T near miners’ shafts (where postes 
d’achat, selling points or buying stations are set up), at counting offices 
(comptoirs) and in mineral depots, before the minerals are exported and 
traded on the international market. In December 2019, the iTSCi was 
operational at 235 mining sites in Tanganyika, North-Kivu and 
South-Kivu. BSP provides artisanal and small-scale mining supply chain 
specific digital risk and impact data packages on a subscription basis to 
downstream companies and consumer brands. It is implemented only in 
North-Kivu where it is in force at five 3T mines (Luholo, Rubaya, 
Kakembe, Bibatama and Ngoy). 
Based on an extensive desk-based literature review, this study aims 
to generate a detailed understanding of the relationships between 
mining reforms and the promotion of accountable, inclusive and effec-
tive governance institutions. The study specifically explores — focusing 
on the period between 2008 and 2019 — if and to what extent those 
mining reforms that were aimed at making mineral supply chains more 
transparent have increased the state’s capacity in governing the 3T 
mining sector. While we acknowledge that different types of non-state 
actors have also been involved in the implementation of the aforemen-
tioned reforms and are thus jointly responsible for their success or 
failure, we believe that a focus on the performance of Congolese state 
agents is justified. The incapacity of Congolese state institutions to 
maintain the rule of law and carry out their administrative duties has 
long been seen as one of the chief culprits for what has been going wrong 
in the Congolese mining sector for several decades (Reyntjens 2005; 
Kennes 2000; de Failly et al. 2013). It is therefore interesting to see 
whether the reforms have changed anything in this regard. 
We would like to emphasize that our decision to evaluate the impact 
of the mining reforms on state performance in the mining sector should 
not be considered as an indication of a normative approach to issues of 
state and governance. Our aim here is not to repeat the now trite chorus 
that Congo is a ‘failed state’, which does not correspond to the Weberian 
ideal-type of how a modern state should function. We agree with the 
critical and growing body of scholarship on the everyday functioning of 
African states (Englebert and Tull 2013; Solhjell 2020; Mulugeta 2020; 
Blundo et al. 2006), which has shown that, despite various forms of state 
malfunctioning and recurring cycles of popular discontent, resistance 
and armed violence, the state and its institutions continue to operate one 
way or another, and governance is being negotiated between a wide 
range of state and non-state actors on a daily basis. In this article, based 
on an extensive literature review, we assess the evidence on whether 
initiatives are reaching their stated objectives, i.e. whether the practices 
of state representatives in charge of regulating the mining sector 
contribute to transparency, accountability, and a greater inclusion of 
women. This does not mean that we subscribe to the technocratic view 
of governance inherent in the ‘good governance’ paradigm. 
The year 2008 was chosen as a cut-off year because, from then on-
wards, most reform initiatives were launched. Based on the review of the 
literature, we identified a series of seven challenges, which seemed to 
come up regularly and demonstrate the lack of effective state perfor-
mance in the mining industry, at least until recently. These challenges 
are: 
3 Such traceability and certification systems have been proposed and piloted 
by the German government through the Federal Bureau of Geo-Sciences and 
Natural Resources BGR and its Certified Trading Chains (CTC) initiative.  
4 Until April 2017, this was called Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du 
Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM). 
5 Tags and bags system allow mineral exports from Congo’s violent places to 
flow legally knowing that they are coming from conflict-free mining sites. The 
tag certifies the mineral as conflict-free. 
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i) Restricted access to and militarization of mining sites  
ii) Poor demarcation of mining sites  
iii) Disorganization of diggers  
iv) Lack of transparency in the minerals’ trade  
v) Taxation issues  
vi) Lack of state accountability towards mining communities  
vii) Precarious inclusion or exclusion of women from mining 
activities 
We argue that these challenges are not new, but have their roots in 
Congo’s long and complex mining history (MacGaffey, 1991; Oma-
sombo, 2001). Recent armed conflicts have only added new layers to 
Map 1. Map of 3T mining sites in Tanganyika, South and North-Kivu. Source: International Peace Information Service (IPIS), Antwerp.  
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existing challenges. While in some areas, the state succeeded in 
addressing some of the challenges but failed to put in place a coherent 
‘model’ for mining governance, in other areas, it has failed to address 
any of the challenges. Consequently, the effects of the aforementioned 
reform initiatives on the state’s performance in the domain of mineral 
resource governance can be described as ambiguous and mixed. 
This paper is organized as follows. Having introduced the topic and 
research question, the next section outlines the methodology used for 
the systematic review of the literature. Section 3 then provides a brief 
history of mining in the study areas prior to the reforms. Section 4 ex-
amines the changes brought about by the reforms regarding the state’s 
performance in addressing each of the seven challenges, and Section 5 
concludes the study. 
2. Methodology 
The selection of the reviewed publications mainly relies on qualita-
tive methods and the application of several criteria. As the first two 
authors of this working paper conducted long-term PhD fieldwork in two 
of three study areas (namely Tanganyika and South-Kivu), they have 
extensive knowledge, experience and networks in the 3T mining sector. 
Thus, the search strategy aimed at identifying relevant documents in 
terms of both peer-reviewed publications and influential research re-
ports by well-known independent think tanks and NGOs like Interna-
tional Peace Information Service (IPIS) or Pole Institute, and academic 
researchers. While we acknowledge that the sources of funding for some 
of this research undertaken by these organizations might raise concerns 
about the objectivity of the findings, we are confident that by discussing 
them alongside high quality academic studies, we have minimized po-
tential bias as much as possible. We selected publications in both French 
and English based on research conducted in the three Congolese prov-
inces of North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Tanganyika. The provinces were 
selected on the basis of (1) the most significant presence of 3T mining, 
(2) the recognition that these minerals have been a driving force in 
fueling local conflict, and (3) the fact that the reforms targeting the 3T 
sector have been in force in these areas for about a decade. See Map 1 
below for an overview of the mining sites. 
Given the multiple similarities between provinces, we decided to 
focus the literature review, and consequently structure the analysis, 
around the seven challenges identified earlier. However, our literature 
search methodology faced one major difficulty, as were unable to 
identify publications which exclusively focused on the performance of 
the Congolese state in governing 3T mining in terms of changes and 
obstacles. Many academic studies as well as ‘gray literature’ (i.e. 
research reports and advocacy documents) dealt at the same time with 
various other aspects of mining governance. We thus adopted a ‘snow-
ball search’ through bibliographies of influential studies (such as 
Cuvelier et al., 2014). It was important to constantly evaluate and adapt 
our search terms, starting with terms derived from the research ques-
tions. Then from these, we were able to access other articles through the 
list of literatures consulted, but also by analyzing the frequency with 
which an article was cited by other authors, which helped us to identify 
more recent publications on the same subject. This allowed us to build 
up a database of a total of 99 sources, including books, book chapters, 
journal articles, PhD theses, policy briefs, international and national 
NGO’s reports, and working papers, which we reviewed for this study. 
An initial review of the available literature allowed us to better un-
derstand the challenges faced by the state in governing 3T mining. We 
then identified specific challenges that were repeated and discussed by 
different sources, and considered them as analytical themes for our 
research. Thus, for consistency and given that much has been written on 
Congo’s mining sector, we decided to incorporate these challenges into a 
broader picture, highlighting the ways in which they preceded current 
reforms. For this reason, rather than framing these challenges as 
emerging from the two last decades of wars and continuing conflict, this 
study puts them into a longer-term perspective. On the basis of changes 
in the state’s performance identified by the literature review, we 
selected the seven major challenges or themes related to this perfor-
mance. We then examined to what extent the reforms affect the state’s 
performance in each of the three provinces concerned by the literature 
review. 
3. The 3T mining sector before the reforms 
3.1. General situation 
A lot has been written about the mining sector in eastern Congo. 
Much of the literature focusing on the study areas (Tanganyika, South 
and North-Kivu) shows that the state’s performance in governing mining 
has been weak, in particular with regard to the seven challenges 
mentioned earlier. Table 1 below provides some examples for each 
challenge from the provinces studied here. Without being too repetitive 
and detailed about the historical evolution of the extractive industry, a 
succinct contextual overview of this evolution and related challenges 
helps to set the stage for an assessment of the state’s current perfor-
mance in governing the mining sector. It is worth mentioning that these 
challenges are not new, as the Congolese state has been confronted with 
and struggling to address them for decades (MacGaffey, 1991). 
A major cross-cutting challenge is the existence of ‘hybrid’ forms of 
resource governance. This suggests that, besides the state, many non- 
state actors are also involved in mining governance. ‘Hybrid’ gover-
nance arrangements especially affect access to the mines, the organi-
zation of diggers and the mineral trade, as well as taxation, given the 
predatory opportunities offered by the sector. ‘Hybrid’ forms of gover-
nance also influence the gender dimension in that exclusion of women 
from mining is either based on local culture or the civil servants’ 
negative attitude towards women (Bashwira, 2017; Bashwira and Hil-
horst, forthcoming). In addition, a range of other actors (including 
armed actors) are involved in the mineral sector’s governance given the 
context of armed rebellion and informality inherent to artisanal mining 
in eastern DRC (Vogel et al., 2018). In many cases, the coexistence of all 
these actors and institutions has given people room to negotiate access 
to resource, while also triggering conflicts (Geenen and Claessens, 2013; 
Hilhorst, 2013). 
Table 1 
The state’s major challenges in governing 3T mining.  
Challenges Manifestations 
1. Restricted access to and 
militarization of mining sites 
In many areas of abundant availability of 
minerals, the state has been struggling to 
get a firm footing. Armed groups are 
involved in mineral extraction, taxation, 
trade, and human rights abuse. 
2. Poor demarcation of mining sites The state has not delineated exclusive 
areas for artisanal mining. 
3. Disorganization of diggers The state struggles to register the diggers 
and fails to control their activities. 
Artisanal miners are not organised in 
recognized structures. 
4.Lack of transparency in the 
minerals’ trade 
Mining activities are subject to corruption, 
fraudulent practices and smuggling 
patterns. State services are unable to 
collect reliable statistics on production and 
mineral exports. 
5.Taxation issues The state is not able to structurally enforce 
applicable taxation rates on the 3T mining 
sector. 
6. Lack of state accountability 
towards mining communities 
Revenues from mining activities do not 
flow back to local communities nor are 
they used to serve the public interest. 
7. Precarious inclusion or exclusion 
of women from mining activities 
Women are excluded from digging 
operations. Alternative livelihoods 
activities for women outside the mining 
sector are practically inexistent. 
Source: authors, based on literature review. 
C. Iguma Wakenge et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The Extractive Industries and Society 8 (2021) 100894
5
3.2. The situation in Tanganyika province 
In Tanganyika, extractive activities started during the Belgian colo-
nial era. In 1932, several deposits of tin were discovered in Manono 
territory and were exploited through artisanal and semi-industrial 
methods by the private company Géomines. In 1967, Géomines was 
replaced by the Société Géologique et Minière du Congo, which became 
Congo-Etain in 1968, then Zaire-Etain in 1971. Zaire-Etain was in 
operation until 1996, when it ceased operations because of the outbreak 
of the first Congolese war (De Koning, 2010). After Zaire-Etain had 
stopped working in the region, many artisanal diggers (creuseurs) began 
to extract tin in the company’s abandoned concessions. In 2007, Tan-
ganyika (Kalemie and Nyunzu territories) gained an increased economic 
importance because of the initiation of artisanal coltan mining (De 
Koning, 2011; Spittaels, 2010; Wakenge, 2017). Coltan is an abbrevia-
tion of columbite–tantalite commonly found in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo. This is a mixture of two mineral ores, namely 
niobium and tantalum, used for industrial applications in high-tech 
industries.6 
Before the reforms, which started at the beginning of the 2000s, 3T 
extraction and trade were largely informal, escaping government con-
trol. Artisanal Exploitation Zones (AEZs)7 did not exist and no mining 
cooperatives were found in the area. Instead, miners were members of 
local miners’ structures (comités de creuseurs) established by themselves 
or by local power holders such as customary chiefs (mwami) who also 
provided land to them. The trade of minerals was not under an efficient 
control of state institutions (e.g. Division des mines or SAEMAPE). State 
agents of these agencies were often unpaid, and visiting mining sites on 
an irregular basis (IPIS, 2015). As a result, the capacity of state in-
stitutions to fulfil their tasks of assisting, monitoring, and recording 
statistics of minerals and regulating the natural resource sector 
remained very limited. 
The trade of 3T from the mining sites to urban-based trading houses 
(comptoirs or maisons d’achat) was performed by independent 
‘négociants’ operating through North-Kivu and South-Kivu until late 
2009. Around the same period, Mining Mineral Resources (MMR)8 
signed a five-year contract (N◦ 06/1331/CABMIN/MAF/KAT/2009) 
with the provincial Katangese government, through which the company 
obtained the exclusive buying rights for minerals extracted in four 
mining sites of northern Katanga, namely Katonge (coltan), Lunga 
(gold), Kisengo (coltan) and Mai-Baridi (coltan). In addition, the pro-
vincial government instituted a $5/kg tax on exporting Katangese 
minerals to other provinces. In response, many traders smuggled min-
erals to the Kivus (Spittaels, 2010: 17) by concealing minerals in com-
mercial trucks in complicity with state agents (Wakenge et al., 2018). 
While the purchasing price of 3T varied from one mining site to another 
and between provinces due to limited oversight of the extractive in-
dustry by the state, minerals were often transported by road or airplane 
to South and North-Kivu provinces. In addition, elements of the Con-
golese army and of non-state armed groups were also present in or 
around the mining areas where they often conducted mass pillaging. 
These groups were involved in 3T extraction and informal taxation (De 
Koning, 2010; IPIS, 2007). Representatives of these groups as well as the 
customary chiefs (Mwami or Bami) levied various kinds of taxes over the 
creuseurs, négociants (mineral buyers) and local traders (De Koning, 
2011; IPIS, 2007; Spittaels, 2010; Wakenge, 2017). As observed else-
where, state weaknesses in controlling mining activities minimises the 
developmental potential of the extractive sector and facilitates the 
involvement of predatory actors, making the miners vulnerable to 
exploitation and human rights abuses (Garrett, 2008: 8). 
3.3. The situation in South-Kivu province 
Like in Tanganyika, the history of 3T mining in South-Kivu province 
can be traced back to the colonial era (De Failly, 2001). Particularly 
important to this region was the introduction of industrial production 
and massive exploitation of 3T (and gold) by diggers under extractive 
companies’ supervision. This situation has had an impact on the political 
economy of 3T extraction and trade. The Belgian colonisers discovered 
alluvial gold deposits in the 1920s. At the time, Baron Empain who 
possessed an enormous territory granted to him by King Leopold II was 
the principal economic actor in this region. He created the Compagnie 
Miniere des Grands Lacs Africains (MGL) in 1923. In 1942, coltan was 
produced by MGL (De Failly, 2001: 9). Until the Congolese indepen-
dence in 1960, MGL was the main extractive company established in 
South-Kivu, before the Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (Sominki) 
was established in 1976 (Geenen, 2016).9 As long as Sominki retained 
effective control over its concessions, artisanal miners operated in a 
controlled environment. However, from 1982 onwards when president 
Mobutu liberalized the mining sector, informal mining and the smug-
gling of minerals proliferated widely, as MacGaffey (1991) demonstrates 
in her seminal work about Zaire’s informal economy. Following this 
liberalization, more and more people started to be attracted to the op-
portunities of the extractive sector. The series of Congo wars (1996–97 
and 1998–2003) led to a great expansion of artisanal 3T (and gold) 
mining like elsewhere in South-Kivu (De Failly, 2001; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004). In May 2019, the International Peace Information 
Service (IPIS), estimated the number of people involved in 3T and gold 
mining in South-Kivu at about 54,425 (Matthysen et al., 2019: 4). 
Rather than acting as an instrument for an efficient governance of 
mining, the state has been playing a weak and parasitic role. Instead of 
regulating artisanal mining, state agents have been levying both legal 
and illegal taxes (De Failly, 2001: 26) and have done little to rid mining 
sites from armed actors’ control. Thus, the state failed in improving the 
living conditions of mining communities. Cuvelier (2010: 8) for instance 
argues that ‘While the Kivus contain significant deposits of coltan, 
cassiterite, wolframite (tungsten) and gold, both the ordinary popula-
tion and people working in the mines suffer various types of abuse and 
harassment from armed groups.’ According to the literature consulted, 
3T mining was controlled by informal and even criminal networks 
(Cuvelier, 2004; Jackson, 2002; Taylor, 2003; UN, 2001). In 2009, 
Global Witness documented the militarization of mining in the 
conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC, the trading networks within the 
mining sector, and their links to military, economic and political actors. 
Before the reforms, militarization of artisanal mines was a major and 
recurrent challenge that hampered state capacity to access and regulate 
mining. The state’s administration (in the form of SAEMAPE and the 
Division des Mines) has been present at mining areas for predatory ac-
tivities, levying all kinds of under-recorded taxes (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004). Several sources also provide information on the 
ways in which armed groups as well as the Congolese army benefited 
from the mineral trade, in particular through an efficient system of 
informal and extra-legal taxation (Global Witness, 2009; Spittaels, 
2010). The benefits generated from these taxes served to personally 
enrich armed commanders and private businessmen, and did not accrue 
6 For more details, see Nest (2011: 3–30).  
7 According to the Congolese Mining Law (Title 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109), the AEZs 
are areas where ‘the technological and economic factors are not suited for the 
site to be industrially exploited.’ AEZs are therefore reserved exclusively for 
artisanal mining.  
8 MMR had its head office in Lubumbashi (capital city of former Katanga) and 
was a subsidiary of the Société Minière du Katanga. 
9 Sominki was a joint-venture of nine mining companies, including Kivumines, 
Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL, which had its concessions in Kamituga), Mines 
Zaïroises d’Or et d’Etain de Kindu (Kinoretain), Compagnie Zaïroise d’Entreprises 
Minières (Cobelmin) and Symetain. It controlled 72 per cent of the local 
resource concessions, with the remaining 28 per cent held by the Government 
of Zaire. 
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to the state treasury. Indeed, the DRC is widely seen by many state 
agents as a predatory state to be plundered rather than to be built. As 
Englebert (2003: 6) argues, ‘the very weakness of the state is a resource 
to many Congolese’. In spite of efforts aimed at formalizing 3T (and 
gold) mining, the militarization of mining areas is still a recurrent 
concern mentioned in the literature consulted. In her recent work, 
Verweijen (2017) for instance analyses the interplay between industrial 
mining, resistance and armed mobilization in the Fizi-Kambambare 
region.10 
3.4. The situation in North-Kivu province 
In North Kivu, 3T minerals are an important source of income for 
many artisanal miners. Weyns et al. (2016: 4) note that 32 per cent of 
miners work in 3T mines, whereas 69 per cent work in gold mines. In 
May 2019, 3T and gold sector accounted for about 21,597 miners in total 
(Matthysen et al., 2019: 4). The structural characteristics of the 3T 
extraction and trade in North Kivu cannot be understood without an 
understanding of the history of mining in this area. This history is 
dominated by the mining operation and decline of the firm Sominki (see 
previous section) combined with the policy that liberalized artisanal 
mining activities in 1982. 
The 3T mines are scattered across North-Kivu province, with the 
most productive mines located in Walikale territory (Garrett and 
Mitchel, 2009). Following the two Congolese wars (1996–97 and 
1998–2003), artisanal 3T mining developed in a complex context of 
armed conflict and the incapacity of state institutions to monitor and 
regulate the natural resource sector. Many artisanal mining sites were 
controlled by armed actors, including Congolese army officials (Global 
Witness, 2009; Garrett et al., 2010). Like elsewhere, scholars observed 
‘hybrid’ forms of resource governance characterized by the involvement 
of non-state actors in (land) mining extraction, trade and economic 
regulations (Raeymaekers 2009; Vlassenroot et al., 2016; Vogel, 2018). 
As Garrett (2008: 8), observes, a complex mix of martial, statutory and 
customary law ruled North Kivu’s artisanal 3T mining sector. This sector 
provided an easy source of revenue to armed actors, a situation partic-
ularly observed in Bisie (Walikale), the biggest 3T mine producer of 
North-Kivu.11 
Militarization of mining sites has been a recurrent problem in North 
Kivu. In the 2000s, many mines were under control of either the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) or different 
rebel groups, namely the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR) in Walikale and Kahuzi-Biéga National Park (neigh-
boring South Kivu) and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple 
(CNDP) in Masisi. Matthysen and Montejano (2013: 13) note that 
‘Rubaya’s mining sector was well-known for being under CNDP control 
in the past. From 2006 onwards, the area was located within CNDP 
territory whose commander (Bosco Ntaganda) gained large revenues 
through taxation.’ This had an impact on the security situation as mining 
provided opportunities for illicit enrichment and sustained war activ-
ities in the area. In September 2009, President Kabila suspended all 
mining activities in Walikale before the decision was expanded to South 
Kivu and Maniema provinces. Geenen (2012) notes that the ban was a 
radical decision which only partially addressed the issues of militari-
zation of mining and contributed little to the formalization of mineral 
extraction. 
At many mining sites, customary chiefs regulated extractive activ-
ities, thus complicating the state’s control over the mining sector. For 
instance, customary authorities allocated land to miners and levied taxes 
on them. In this governance system, state and non-state actors operated 
and colluded for profit to the detriment of miners, the local communities 
and the central government. Illegal taxation of the 3T sector by all these 
actors was ubiquitous in the mines and along the trading routes (Garrett 
and Mitchel, 2009; Pole Institute, 2002). As Cuvelier (2010: 28) notes, 
‘the exploitation and trade of minerals are subject to a whole array of 
taxes with varying degrees of legality’. As a result, the mining trade 
infrastructure was left in a dire condition, which complicates access and 
transportation and facilitates the activities of predation by armed actors 
(Hoffmann et al., 2016). 
Before the mining reforms, smuggling patterns and illegal taxation 
characterized the trade of 3T in North Kivu as well. According to Garrett 
(2008), this situation resulted from the high cost of exporting minerals, 
comprising both disproportionate export charges and bribes in which 
state officials were involved. This author also reports that, at the end of 
the 2000s, around 43 per cent of 3T minerals extracted from North Kivu 
were unrecorded by the comptoirs. Smuggling also happened by way of 
under-declaring or wrongly declaring the exported shipments of min-
erals by many comptoirs, in complicity with state agents. Either way, the 
revenues generated were not directed to the public treasury. 
3.5. Women and mining: an overview 
This section addresses the situation of women in the mines of eastern 
Congo, who are both excluded from the sector, as well as marginalized 
within the sectorWe note that this topic is less documented for the 
period before 2010, compared to the period since then. Very few aca-
demic papers and reports from the pre-2010 period refer to women and 
if they do, it is usually done in a fragmented or superficial manner. This 
is not because women were not present in the mining sector at that time, 
or because their presence was not allowed. Indeed, under DRC law and 
the 2006 Constitution, women have equal right to work in mining under 
DRC law and the country’s constitution. The latter stipulates that ‘all 
Congolese have the right to benefit from national wealth. The state has 
the duty to redistribute this wealth equitably and guarantee the right to 
development.’12 However, as we will see below, women are marginal-
ized in the sector, and also in the legal framework. For instance, the 
2018 mining code only mentions women in connection with the fact that 
it prohibits pregnant women from accessing mining activities (Art. 5 on 
p. 17). In addition to being marginalized in the sector, as mentioned by 
Pact (2010), there exist various provincial and local level instruments 
and norms which limit the equal access of women to the sector (see also 
Bashwira and Cuvelier 2016; Bashwira and Hilhorst, forthcoming). This 
is due mostly to cultural perceptions about whether it is acceptable or 
not for a woman to work in mining. Artisanal and Small scale mining 
(ASM) is commonly considered to be a male-dominated industry, with 
this “masculine” image continuing to have a strong effect on excluding 
women from working in the mining deemed to be men’s work, and 
physically demanding (Lahiri-Dutt, 2012: 193). 
Nevertheless, a large number of women are present and participate 
in a variety of mining activities (Bashwira, 2017; Buss et al., 2017; 
Hayes and Perks, 2012; Kelly et al., 2014; Pact, 2010), although they 
perform manual tasks that are generally not well paid, including digging 
in opencast mines, gridding, pounding and sifting the minerals, crush-
ing, milling, and sorting minerals, panning dust minerals, etc. (Bashwira 
2017; Bashwira 2019). While not focusing only on the DRC case, Buss 
et al. (2017) have found similarities across their research locations in 
DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Women also own shops, restaurants, and 
perform other small activities. As highlighted by several authors, mining 
contributes directly and indirectly to the livelihood of many households 
(Bashwira et al., 2014; Buss et al., 2017; Kamundala and Mukasa, 2017; 
Kelly et al., 2014). However, the sector is also characterized by great 
gender inequality where women make up only 20% of the ASM labor 
10 For a holistic analysis of the large variety of factors shaping social mobili-
zation around industrial mining in South Kivu, see Geenen and Verweijen 2017.  
11 In 2011, Alphamin acquired a research permit that allowed the company to 
exploit Bisie tin deposit under its subsidiary Alphamin Bisie Mining SA. For 
details, see Fahey and Mutumayi, 2019. 12 Article 58 of the DRC Constitution, 2006. 
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force and around 50% of the community living in mining areas but they 
hardly occupy decision-making positions (Kamundala, 2020: 420). 
One of the great challenges for women lies in gaining access to the 
inside of the pit. It is the only place where women are not supposed to be 
present, though there are a few exceptions here and there. According to 
many local customs in the DRC, this is an area exclusively reserved to 
men (Rutherford and Buss, 2019). In fact, as Buss et al. (2017: 38) note, 
for individual artisanal miners, working, owning or controlling the mine 
pit is one of the more lucrative aspects of ASM, and these tend to be kept 
almost exclusively in the hands of men. Thus, women are mainly 
assigned to low-paid and low-valued jobs in the artisanal mining sector, 
and they generally earn less than men. Buss et al. (2017: 33) note that 
even when women and men perform the same tasks such as washing or 
crushing, women earn around 40 per cent less than men. Kamundala 
(2020: 423) found that women may earn between 40USD to 120USD per 
month depending on their activities in the sector, while men earn up to 
337USD in the gold mining and 187USD in the 3Ts sector. In the same 
vein, Huggins et al. (2017) attribute the women’s poor positions in 
formal and informal mining to this limitation on women’s access to the 
most profitable mining activities. For the majority of these women, 
exclusion from the mining activity itself confines them to the least 
qualified and least profitable jobs, and it deprives them of the power to 
negotiate their remuneration and working conditions. 
Besides the harsh working conditions, women also face various 
economic challenges as a result of the lack of access to, use of and control 
over resourceful productive activities. They include the difficulty to 
manage and sell their production (and as consequence they have to hire 
male miners to work for them), and problems with obtaining mining 
licenses and mining property rights in their own names. Many women, 
particularly those working in the mining sector in artisanal mining 
towns in Eastern DRC, are also (voluntarily or not) involved in the sex 
industry to earn an income (Bashwira, 2017; Buss, 2018; Formson and 
Hilhorst, 2016; Kelly et al., 2014; Rustad et al., 2016). 
In addition, women may also experience family problems related to 
their presence in the mining industry. In fact, women do not generally 
perform mining roles as part of a team: they may be members of an 
association but working in ways that allow them to balance mining with 
household obligations. Some women have reported difficulties in 
feeding their children after their husbands died or abandoned them 
(either because they wanted to go to another mine or because they 
ended the relationship). Working in mining often seems to be the only 
option available to women. To start working in mines, some have to 
"buy" an entry fee from the site owner or administrative manager by 
selling their bodies (Bashwira 2017). Although members of mining 
communities acknowledge the existence of acts of sexual and 
gender-based violence perpetrated at mining sites, they are also reluc-
tant to refer them to the police. This is partly because rape is not 
considered as a serious crime (when it is between two adults) and for 
those victims who are under age, most parents consider that traditional 
leaders can better deal with sexual assault than state institutions 
(Bashwira and Hintjens, 2019). The works by Buss (2018) and Rustad 
et al. (2016) are part of a growing body of studies on the relation be-
tween mining and gender-based violence. 
In the provinces of Tanganyika, North-Kivu and South-Kivu, the 
situation of women in the mining sector has changed over the years, due 
to significant changes in social practices. Hayes and Perks (2012: 531) 
note that, according to Congolese women themselves, pre-war social 
practices were less favorable for gender equality and gave less respect to 
women, while on the other hand, traditional structures had a more 
positive influence and provided a certain degree of security for women. 
In the post-war period, it is possible to observe the evolving role of the 
state and the challenges it is facing, and how various actors (including 
capitalist corporations,) are trying to include women into mining 
governance at the national and local levels, while at the same time on 
the ground other actors (such as armed groups, traditional authorities, 
minerals’ smugglers and cooperatives) perpetuate the predatory 
practices shaping mining governance at the expense of lower-income 
actors like women (Bashwira and Cuvelier, 2019; Bashwira and Hil-
horst, forthcoming). 
Indeed, when evaluating the role of the (modern) state in mineral 
resource governance with regard to gender, a distinction can be made 
between three major periods: 
First, the colonial era was characterized by the development of large- 
scale mining.13 At that time, as extractive companies retained control 
over their concessions, only a few women were involved in the mining 
industry. The idea was that if miners’ conditions were improved, this 
would automatically lead to an improvement in their wives’ conditions 
and the development of the entire community. 
The liberalization of the mining sector in 1982 marked the beginning 
of the second period. It opened up the sector to thousands of artisanal 
miners (men and women) and allowed new power holders, such as 
customary chiefs, land owners, and négociants (middlemen) to be 
embedded in the political economy of extraction. While there was (and 
still is) a widespread belief that women are unclean and therefore not 
allowed to touch the mineral, or that it is too dangerous for them given 
the frequent occurrence of landslides, this period saw a major shift from 
a central role of the state in the minerals’ sector governance to the 
introduction of new actors who have influenced patterns on women’s 
inclusion/exclusion in the mining industry. 
The third period covers the series of wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003) 
which caused a shift of power among different actors involved in the 
mining industry, including armed actors.14 The emergence of the ‘con-
flict mineral’ label or narrative led to a great concern about women’s 
marginalization and sexual exploitation, as many analysts established a 
straight line of cause and effect between armed conflicts - artisanal 
mining - sexual violence, especially in the mining areas (Autesserre, 
2012). 
Having reviewed the situation of women (vis-à-vis men) in the 
mining sector, we now turn to the analysis of the seven governance 
challenges in the mining sector and the state’s performance in 
addressing them in the post-reform period. As mentioned above, these 
challenges were identified based on their frequent mention in the 
literature reviewed for this paper. 
4. Addressing the governance challenges in the mining sector: 
post-reform changes and limitations in state performance 
This section shows that there is quite some variation between the 
three provinces when it comes to the state’s performance in governing 
the mining sector. Indeed, many of the initiatives have contributed to 
improving this performance and have had significant influence on how 
the state governs the mines today. Yet, there are also a number of ob-
stacles and limitations in addressing the challenges presented in Table 1. 
4.1. Access and militarization of mining sites 
Ribot and Peluso (2003: 160) define access as all ‘means, processes 
and relations by which actors are enabled to gain, control and maintain 
access to resources’. Following the reforms, the presence of the state 
administration increased at some mining sites. A report by Jorns and 
Chishugi (2015) notes for the case of Tanganyika that, following the 
implementation of iTSCi in 2011, the state increased its presence at 
mining sites, even though it does not manifest itself as a unified body 
(see also Diemel (2018)). State agents of SAEMAPE and the Division des 
Mines ‘tag and bag’ minerals, record statistics of production on a per-
manent basis, and are technically and financially supported by the iTSCi 
13 There was also a pre-colonial tradition of artisanal mining and metallurgy 
before colonization, see De Hemptinne (1926).  
14 For an analysis of the transformative effects of the two Congo wars, see 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004). 
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program. In the case of Tanganyika, until mid-2019, the Mining Mineral 
Resources (MMR) company provided a financial incentive, such as a 
monthly allowance of about 100 USD for each policeman. At artisanal 
mines where iTSCi is in force, state agencies have their representatives 
in close proximity to many of these mines. The literature review also 
reveals that through local representatives, the mining administration 
monitors the 3T supply chain, records statistics of minerals, and medi-
ates conflicts between local mining stakeholders, for instance regarding 
thefts of minerals (Bashizi and Geenen, 2015; Buraye, 2018). SAEMAPE 
employees closely watch the working conditions of diggers, and tag 
minerals in collaboration with iTSCi employees. 
The mining sites where iTSCi is in force are under the control of the 
mining police,15 which is a government body working directly with the 
national ministry of mines (Jorns and Chishugi, 2015; Mthembu-Salter, 
2011; ). However, the presence of state agents at mining sites is 
contingent upon iTSCi’s operations. At the sites where iTSCi is not 
operational or has been suspended, the presence of state agents is 
limited and the involvement of armed actors in mining activities has not 
fully been stopped. At these sites, state agents are left with little material 
capacity to ensure a smooth functioning of traceability (Jorn and Chis-
hugi, 2015; Wakenge, 2017). In addition, an increased presence of state 
agents does not mean that all the artisanal mines are under state control. 
In Shabunda, Kalehe and Fizi territories for instance, some mines are 
under the control of armed groups, or are regularly looted by these 
groups (Matthysen et al., 2019: 7). In addition, often ‘underpaid or 
unpaid, the state agents who are in the field find themselves needing to 
resort to alternative strategies to survive, through extortion or theft’ 
(Vogel et al., 2018: 78). In Nyabibwe, for instance, Vogel et al. (2018: 
78) were told by people that SAEMAPE agents on some occasions collect 
taxes from chefs de puits (pit owners) or ‘sell tags to miners for money’16 
(Vogel et al. 2018: 78). This finding suggests that extended state 
involvement does not necessarily mean that governance practices have 
improved. At a number of mining sites, public authority may function in 
a fragmented fashion, meaning that many actors claim prerogatives in 
governing the mines (Diemel, 2018; Vogel, 2018). The same situation 
was observed in North Kivu. In many mining areas, state agents are not 
present on a permanent basis but only visit the mines once a month or 
even less. The main reason for this seems to be the limited number of 
state agents, the remoteness of certain mines, the presence of armed 
actors, and the lack of financial incentives (Jaillon et al., 2019). Cuve-
lier et al. (2014) however argue that certain state security agents have 
developed strategies to circumvent the restrictions on their direct 
interference in the mineral sector, e.g. through pit ownership via 
intermediaries. 
In theory, there are no armed actors at mining sites which are labeled 
as “green”.17 This means that, in areas where reforms are being imple-
mented, the security situation is relatively safe. In an earlier report, 
Matthysen and Montejano (2013: 11) note that ‘local stakeholders 
explained how Rubaya’s mining sector (where iTSCi is operational) has 
revived over the last year. Miners witnessed a relatively increased level 
of security, opening up the area for the influx of thousands of miners.’ 
Yet, despite an improvement in the security situation at some mines, 
pockets of insecurity still persist in most areas, like in Masisi territory 
where Nyatura rebels are present and interfere in mining through 
taxation (Matthysen and Montejano, 2013). Over time, Weyns et al. 
(2016: 27) observed an increase in the role of non-state armed actors 
with regards to interference in mining and mineral trade, becoming 
relatively bigger in North-Kivu than in the rest of eastern DRC in general. 
FARDC, fighters of the armed groups such as the Forces Démocratiques de 
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Nduma defense of Congo (NDC) are 
notorious for the income they generate from North Kivu’s mining sector. 
A similar situation was observed in South-Kivu. In 2019, about 250 
sites (of 3T and gold) were validated as “green”, out of about 700 
identified sites. However, as Radley and Vogel (2015: 409) note: ‘the 
fluidity of armed movements in the Kivus makes the validation of “clean 
sites” both difficult and unreliable over time’, because the delay be-
tween when a mine site is visited, validated, and included into a trace-
ability scheme can be long and offers opportunities for non-state armed 
actors to benefit from mining or levy taxes over it. Even in areas where 
iTSCi is operational, for example in Kalimbi, the literature shows that 
the diggers do not work safely. They suffer from human rights abuses 
such as arbitrary arrest and imprisonment at the hands of the police or 
FARDC (Vogel et al., 2018: 77). In a recent report, Matthysen et al. 
(2019) point out that compared to other eastern provinces, South-Kivu 
has recently the highest record of armed interference in mining, with 
28 per cent of all cases. In more remote areas, especially in Shabunda 
where, due to insecurity, the traceability scheme is experiencing a 
difficult implementation, armed interference in mining by both FARDC 
soldiers and non-state armed groups seems to continue undisturbed 
(Mattyssen et al. 2019:4) 
Mining sites in Tanganyika province have suffered less from armed 
group interference in the last few years (Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015; 
Matthysen and Montejano, 2013).18 In 2015, before the outbreak of 
conflict between the Luba and the Pygmies in Nyunzu, Kabalo and 
Kalemie,19 it was reported that many stakeholders (from government 
and iTSCi agents to MMR, Coopérative des artisanaux miniers du Congo 
- CDMC, miners and local communities), agreed that the security situ-
ation in and around the mines in Tanganyika had improved greatly since 
the implementation of the traceability and due diligence measures 
(IPIS, 2015; Mthembu-Salter, 2011). One manifestation of this 
improvement is the absence of armed groups and FARDC soldiers 
directly or indirectly benefiting from minerals at the mining sites or 
along transportation routes. 
4.2. Demarcation of mining sites 
A provision from the 2018 Mining Law (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 
109) stipulates that the Ministry of Mines may demarcate the Artisanal 
Exploitation Zones (AEZs) in areas where ‘the technological and eco-
nomic factors are not suited for the site to be industrially exploited’. The 
AEZs are to be determined and proclaimed by Ministerial Decree upon 
advice of the provincial mining administration. In addition, the law 
stipulates that the sites covered by industrial mining titles cannot be 
transformed into AEZs. In turn, companies cannot acquire research 
permits inside the AEZ boundaries without the support from artisanal 
15 The mining police or Police des mines et hydraucarbures (PMH) is a unit of the 
PNC (Police Nationale Congolaise, Congolese national police) in charge of 
providing collective security in the mines. For details, see Hönke (2010).  
16 The iTSCi chain of custody system includes bar-coded tags that are to be 
added to each bag of minerals at the first two steps of the supply chain: 
extraction and processing. The tagging is completed by detailed data collection 
through specifically designed log books for each actor in the supply chain: mine 
worker; négociant and processor; comptoirs and exporter. 
17 The Ministry Decree of 29 February 2012 fixing the procedure for qualifi-
cation and validation of mining sites in gold and tin trading in the provinces of 
Katanga, Maniema, North and South Kivu and Orientale Provinces states that 
mining sites are receiving green, yellow or red labels depending on the degree 
to which the social and security conditions in and around the mines are met. 
18 According to Matthysen et al. (2019: 23), IPIS developed the concept of 
interference in mining activities, which is defined as the presence of an armed 
group or the presence of undisciplined FARDC elements (militaires indisciplinés).  
19 This conflict originates in the marginalization of the Twa minority group 
due to a combination of limited access to resources, exclusion from local 
decision-making and systematic discrimination by the Bantou. The conflict has 
resulted in large-scale violence and displacement. For more details, see Groleau 
2017. 
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miners’ cooperatives (groupements des creuseurs). However, in some 
cases, the mining titles attributed by the Cadastre minier20 are located on 
sites covered by either exploration or exploitation permits of industrial 
companies. For example, in South Kivu, this is the case of Banro and the 
Société Aurifère du Kivu-Maniema (SAKIMA). This case indicates a 
disconnect between the situation on the ground and the decision-making 
processes. As IPIS (2015) reports, requests to demarcate AEZs are rarely 
based on a thorough assessment of mining activity or the potential of the 
mining site. Some AEZs are proclaimed and demarcated by the Cadastre 
minier far away in Kinshasa, without any baseline study conducted on 
the ground. On the other hand, some artisanal mining sites may be 
located in areas free of any mining title (i.e. they are not recognized by 
the law), which positions the miners as engaging in informal practices. 
Indeed, as is also observed in South-Kivu, requests to demarcate 
AEZs are rarely based on the results of geological studies at mining sites. 
IPIS (2015: 22) notes that, when superimposing the mining titles 
attributed by the Cadastre minier to the AEZs locations, it becomes 
apparent that about 62 per cent of the mining sites are located in areas 
covered by either exploration or exploitation permits of industrial 
companies. This shows that the implementation of additional AEZs 
could greatly contribute to the strengthening of the artisanal miners’ 
legal status and thus improve the formalization of the sector.21 The 
revised 2002 mining law explicitly mandates SAEMAPE to initiate these 
proceedings. Recent efforts by the national Ministry of Mines, which in 
March 2016 proclaimed a string of new AEZs in Walikale in North Kivu, 
constitute a positive development in this respect. 
As for Tanganyika province, in 2017 eight AEZs of coltan were 
demarcated and proclaimed in Kalemie and Nyunzu territories, with 
approximately 2500 creuseurs in total (Wakenge, 2017: 63). However, in 
some cases, for instance in the mine of Kahendwa, this demarcation was 
a source of conflicts over property rights between mining cooperatives 
(Matthysen and Montejano, 2013; Wakenge 2018). In 2019, 74 AEZs 
were identified in South-Kivu among which 27 are still under review for 
demarcation. Mining activities take place on most of the AEZs, even 
those labeled as ‘red’. 
4.3. Organizing diggers 
The need for organizing the diggers follows from the creation of AEZs 
and the fact that a committee of diggers should manage the area by 
constituting a ‘mining cooperative’, a formal institution recognized by 
the state. In other words, diggers create their own mining cooperatives, 
which must represent their interests. After the lifting of Kabila’s ban in 
March 2011 (for North, South Kivu and Maniema), miners were again 
allowed to work, but according to a ministerial decree (2010),22 they 
can only do so in legal AEZs and when they organize themselves in co-
operatives (Geenen, 2012). The literature search found that until the end 
of 2019, only a total of three mining cooperatives existed in Tanga-
nyika.23 While all three cooperatives seemed to have a need for more 
technical and managerial capacity, the cooperative with the most 
members is CDMC (Jorns and Chishugi, 2015; Wakenge and Hilhorst, 
2017). Indeed, the creation and functioning of mining cooperatives in 
South-Kivu are critically assessed in several studies (Bashizi and 
Geenen, 2015; Cuvelier, 2013; De Haan and Geenen, 2016). 
Matthysen et al. (2019: 46) note that at 87 percent of all validated 
mines where iTSCi was in force, mining cooperatives were present, 
compared to 66 per cent at non-iTSCi mines, and 69 per cent at mines 
that have not been validated. However, this promising trend does not 
necessarily result in better functioning cooperatives, mainly due to 
widespread elite capture (see below). First, the actual practices of the 
cooperatives in North-Kivu (like elsewhere in eastern DRC) do not 
reflect the idea of a cooperative as described under international stan-
dards and Congolese Law (Ministerial decree No. 004/2001 of 20 July 
2001), which would include among other requirements; voluntary and 
open membership, democratic control, and economic participation by 
the members (Bahalaokwibuye 2017). Second, there is very little 
involvement of artisanal miners in the creation of cooperatives and 
decision-making procedures (Matthysen et al., 2019: 21; Wakenge and 
Hilhorst, 2017). Third, cooperatives rarely provide technical assistance 
or improved tools to miners. 
Indeed, most cooperatives have been subject to elite capture and 
serve the interests of their most prominent members, including 
customary chiefs and mineral traders, rather than advancing those of 
miners (De Haan and Geenen, 2016). In North-Kivu, mining co-
operatives have regularly established a monopoly on mineral trade and 
miners claim that the cooperatives set bad prices (Matthysen et al., 
2019: 33). In addition, a significant number of cooperatives are estab-
lished along ethnic lines as vehicles for different communities to protect 
their interests. This could potentially increase community tensions over 
access to resources. For instance, in Kalay Boeing, a mine located in 
Walikale territory, local people claimed that the Cooperative des Creu-
seurs Artisanaux de Mpama Bisie (COCABI) was not representative for 
their community. At Rubaya (Masisi territory), tensions have developed 
along the community fault lines that surface via the conflict between the 
mining Coopérative des Artisanaux Miniers de Masisi (COOPERAMMA) 
and the Société Minière de Bisunzu (SMB) who is Rubaya’s concession 
holder (Matthysen et al., 2019: 34). 
The same problem of elite capture is being seen in Tanganyika where 
CDMC is established. This cooperative was created in the city of 
Lubumbashi by elites, including state officials, and not by the diggers 
themselves. Until 2017, CDMC was the only partner of MMR in the 
mineral trade (Bashwira, 2017; Freudenthal, 2017; Wakenge, 2017). 
While this partnership made it easier to implement and manage the 
iTSCi closed supply chain, the sale of minerals to a single entity like 
MMR/CDMC created a monopsony situation to the detriment of the 
miners (Matthysen and Montejano, 2013; Johnson, 2013). Thus, the 
bargaining capacity of artisanal diggers over mineral price setting was 
dramatically reduced. As a result, diggers often violently opposed the 
MMR/CDMC’s price-setting policies (Wakenge, 2017). While the state 
has tried to support the working of mining cooperatives, it has been 
unable to curtail the MMR/CDMC’s monopsony position. 
Furthermore, the state’s requirement to organise artisanal miners in 
formal institutions has yielded unintended consequences. Studying the 
examples of the Coopérative du Bien-être de Kalehe (COOMBECKA) and 
the Coopérative Miniere de Kalimbi (COMIKA), Cuvelier (2013) and 
Bashizi and Geenen (2015) show that, by taking advantage of the 
weaknesses of state institutions, the functioning of these cooperatives is 
shaped by the influence of ‘big men’ who run the show and are able to 
install their own exploitative working arrangements in the mines. In the 
same vein, Vogel et al. (2018: 75) observe that, in some cases, mining 
cooperatives found themselves opposed to each other over access to the 
mines shafts. In addition, there are reports of ‘pseudo mining co-
operatives’ who are in fact acting as branch of bigger private companies, 
rather than representing the local miners’ interests. In short, given the 
fact that many cooperatives do not represent the interests of miners who 
‘have little knowledge of how cooperatives are managed and how 
minerals are sold’ (De Haan and Geenen, 2016: 827), scholars have 
asked whether these structures have become ‘saviors’ or rather ‘ex-
ploiters’ of the diggers. Overall, the functioning of mining cooperatives 
20 The Mining Cadastre (or Cadastre Minier) is the Congolese authority in 
charge of granting exploration and exploitation permits, as well as demarcating 
AEZs.  
21 There is an intense debate about the pro and cons of formalizing artisanal 
and small-scale mining. For more details, see Geenen (2012) and Maconachie 
and Hilson (2011).  
22 Arrêté ministériel n◦ 0706/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010 du 20 septembre 
2010 portant mesures urgentes d’encadrement de la décision de suspension des 
activités minières dans les provinces du Maniema, Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu  
23 CDMC, VIMATED (Vijana Maendeleo, Tanganyika) and CMMA 
(Coopérative Minière Maendeleo). 
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has escaped effective state control. 
4.4. Transparency in trading minerals 
Transparency refers to the fact that the mineral supply chain should 
be clean from tainted minerals, i.e. minerals originating from conflict 
regions. Some studies note that, in Tanganyika, transparency in mineral 
trading has improved as government representatives are able to collect 
and analyse statistics on production and legal exports, and they know 
the actors involved in the mineral supply chains (Jorns and Chishugi 
2015). Yet, other studies reveal that the smuggling of minerals from 
Tanganyika to South-Kivu persists, albeit to a smaller extent than before 
(Wakenge et al., 2018). An earlier study by Mthembu-Salter (2011) on 
the due diligence application by MMR stated that the company esti-
mated that 5–10 per cent of minerals extracted within its concessions 
was stolen and sold to other traders. In the same vein, Freudenthal 
(2017), a freelance investigative reporter, has noted that, at the time of 
his research in the area, minerals were still being smuggled out of 
MMR’s concessions with the complicity of state agents. This author adds 
that the mines validated as conflict-free were sometimes just a few hills 
away from places where violent conflict was still going on. These find-
ings raise doubt on the full transparency of the closed-pipe supply chain 
and on the capacity of the state to control this chain even in a region 
with a relatively well-established minerals’ trade structure (Matthysen 
et al., 2019; Vogel, 2018). 
In other areas, the mineral supply chain has become more trans-
parent than before. While the armed groups may still interfere occa-
sionally, no interference has been directly noticed at the mines (Vogel, 
2018). However, as noted above, in some mining areas (e.g. in Itebero, 
Walikale) state agents - for whom the tags provide an additional source 
of income - are involved in the (illicit) commercialization of tags. Mat-
thysen et al. (2019: 51) point out that because of this practice of selling 
tags, there is a high risk of contamination of responsible supply chains, 
as the origin of minerals tagged by the négociants themselves is not 
known or recorded. Like in Tanganyika, the mines where iTSCi is in 
force are only ‘enclaves of regulations’ (Wakenge, 2017: 36), where the 
system performs within the confines of a given mining area. In short, 
risks of contamination are higher in areas under the control of armed 
groups. In their 2019 report, Matthysen et al. (p. 51) provide an 
example: ‘In Masisi territory, the validated coltan mines Katovu and 
Rwandanda are located in an area controlled by the Nyatura rebels. In 
September 2018, the mines employ about 50 miners, who allegedly have 
to work one day per week for the rebels. The minerals are reportedly 
transported to the village Kibabi, to be tagged over there.’ Such an 
example raises doubt on the transparency of the 3T supply chain in some 
areas. 
Transparency is also negatively affected by the fact that, according to 
the literature (Matthysen and Montejano, 2013; Vogel et al., 2018; 
Weyns et al., 2016), state agents have difficulty in accessing mining sites 
in conflict-prone areas where militias are still active. This opens a 
window of opportunity for armed actors and other business entrepre-
neurs to operate in the shadow and (illicitly) benefit from the mining 
activities (Vogel, 2018). Most state agents perform their activities at 
more secured and accessible mining areas where the traceability scheme 
(especially iTSCi) is developed. However, it is not yet clear - even in such 
areas – to what extent miners and minerals’ traders comply with the new 
proposed transparency standards (Radley and Vogel, 2015). 
4.5. Taxation on mining 
As shown in the case of other African artisanal mining contexts, 
moves towards ‘formalization have tended to centre on monitoring, 
regulating and tracking mining activities, in the hope of channeling 
more revenue to a central government authority’ (Maconachie and 
Hilson, 2011: 301). Indeed, as the ASM sector is taxed at both the pro-
vincial and central levels, both provincial and central government 
administrations have an interest in maximizing revenues from taxation. 
However, Müller-Koné (2015) has shown that such an interest may not 
necessarily lead to a coordinated top-down approach. On the contrary, 
efforts at revenue maximization can be much more decentralized and 
messier, and in fact serve to satisfy personal or patronage networks. For 
example, Matthysen et al. (2019: 46) noted that ‘fighting illegal taxation 
is an important challenge for responsible sourcing efforts, in order to 
convince people of the added value of working within the formal sector.’ 
The literature consulted reveals that as a result of formalization, the tax 
burden on participants in ASM has increased, because, on the one hand, 
the payment of official taxes is now being monitored more strictly than 
before, while, on the other hand, there are still a number of illegal taxes 
that have continued to exist. Vogel (2018) notes that, at both validated 
and non-iTSCi sites, a higher number of state services and non-state 
actors have been reported to levy taxes (Vogel 2018). IPIS (2015) data 
shows that, to some extent, responsible sourcing efforts have managed to 
address this issue. 
Even though armed actors are reported to no longer operate at the 
mines (Weyns et al., 2016), it is hard to claim that the collection of 
unofficial taxes by state actors has been reduced. According to some 
scholars, enforcing official taxation is the most significant achievement 
of the implementation of the traceability chain. For example, Jorns and 
Chishugi (2015: 67) note that in Tanganyika, thanks to the ‘due dili-
gence system and the increased transparency in the supply chain, the 
government has been able to collect statistics on the amount of minerals 
produced and exported, and hence collect tax revenues.’ These authors 
note that, in the fiscal year 2012, MMR declared to have paid a total of 
2824,601 USD in taxes on the production and exportation of minerals. 
However, informal taxation persists in other forms, such as the monthly 
allowance paid by MMR to several customary chiefs (Wakenge, 2017), 
and other illegal taxes levied over artisanal miners by these chiefs (Ngoy 
Luhaka, 2017). 
The case of South-Kivu provides credence to this observation. Even if 
formalization has greatly contributed to raising taxes collected by the 
state, Vogel et al. (2018: 77) note that with the advent of mineral 
traceability, new forms of taxation have emerged (Max Impact, 2016; 
Vogel, 2018). Also, in some mines where iTSCi is in force, SAEMAPE 
employees seek alternative revenues to compensate for their vulnerable 
positions due to the chronic non-payment by the state. In North-Kivu 
and South-Kivu, the provincial governments instituted a ‘Basket Fund’ 
in 2012, with fixed contributions (between 25 and 75 USD per ton of 3Ts 
exportation) from cooperatives, négociants, transporters, entités de 
traitement (processing entities) and trading houses (comptoirs) to fund a 
provincial development plan. The management of this fund was opaque 
to such an extent that it did little to respond to the needs of the mining 
communities (Wakenge and Kitungano, 2021). On 1 February 2019, the 
national Ministry of Mines banned the collection of taxes by the Basket 
Fund (Letter N◦CAB.MIN/MINES/01/0051/2019) as these taxes overlap 
with the ones which extractive companies have to pay towards the 
development of mining communities, as stipulated in the 2018 mining 
law (T. X, Chap. II, Article 258 bis). 
Indeed, as of 2019, at non-iTSCi mines in the Kivus (including 
Maniema), there were 19 different authorities (besides the Division des 
Mines and SAEMAPE) which were levying taxes, compared to seven 
different authorities at iTSCi sites (Matthysen et al., 2019; see also Max 
Impact 2016). This fragmentation of taxation suggest that efforts to 
coordinate tax collection by the state have not been successful at sites 
where iTSCi is not operational. Although formalization has increased 
revenues from mineral exports, Vogel (2018) provides similar evidence 
arguing that informal taxes arise in the shadow of iTSCi. It is also re-
ported that state services often do not fulfill their responsibilities and 
even conduct illegal activities, for instance levying taxes over mining in 
the Kahuzi national parc (Itebero/Walikale), an area where artisanal 
mining is forbidden. Another issue (mentioned in the previous section) 
that has surfaced regularly and which has been reported for instance in 
Itebero (Walikale), is that SAEMAPE agents have developed a practice of 
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selling tags to négociants, or sometimes to cooperatives, for 500 FC or 
1000 FC per piece (Jaillon et al., 2019: 50). Such a practice illustrates 
that it is quite ironic and painful that a mechanism such as iTSCi, which 
was introduced with the aim of fighting illegal practices in the sales of 
minerals has been used to levy illegal taxes. This illustrates how new 
regulation allows state agents to abuse their positions and use their 
power to instrumentalize technical interventions for their own purposes. 
4.6. Accountability towards mining communities 
Accountability refers to the extent to which power holders or a 
governing entity (such as Congolese state agents) inform the population 
of their actions, development interventions and response to local needs, 
policies, decisions; justify them, and are sanctioned/punished in case of 
violations (Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015). The introduction of the 
conflict mineral policy has certainly left its mark on the state’s perfor-
mance. Yet, in North-Kivu as elsewhere, this does not mean that the state 
is more responsive to local needs than before. The literature shows that 
in general, following formalization, the state has done little to improve 
the living conditions of miners (Johnson, 2013; Murairi and Kubuya, 
2012; Vogel et al., 2018). In many cases, the analysis of the situation on 
the ground in places such as Walikale, Masisi (which are among the 
richest in mineral resources of North-Kivu) and in many mining areas of 
South-Kivu, shows that the development of the local mining commu-
nities has never been taken into due account (Murairi and Kubuya, 2012; 
Wakenge and Kitungano, 2021). 
Studies and policy reports note that even if the collection of tax 
revenues from mining has been an important achievement in itself, the 
economic and social impacts of these revenues and the reforms initia-
tives in general remain unclear (Diemel and Hilhorst, 2019; Jorns and 
Chishugi, 2015; Matthysen and Montejano, 2013). In the case of Tan-
ganyika, apart from MMR paying state agents a monthly allowance 
(so-called motivation) and building some social facilities such as health 
centres, schools and road rehabilitation (Wakenge, 2018), revenues do 
not flow back to the villages, territories or even the district of Tanga-
nyika, and do not benefit the local population. 
As has been documented elsewhere, the rise of neoliberal discourses 
of transparency, accountability, and good governance and the 
concomitant bureaucratic demands can multiply rather than diminish 
opportunities for corruption and fraud (Tidey 2013). The situation in 
North-Kivu and South-Kivu illustrates this trend. In 2012–13, the Basket 
Fund (mentioned earlier) was introduced in both provinces. However, 
the mining communities concerned often lamented that none of the 
promised development projects were successfully implemented, though 
‘there is evidence of a few success stories’ (Vogel et al., 2018: 78). In a 
recent study, Wakenge and Kitungano (2021) demonstrate that due to 
their political influence and through twisted and predatory budgetary 
practices of embezzlement, the provincial state authorities involved in 
managing the Basket Fund were found to derive personal benefits, 
including political positioning from it, while stifling the development of 
the mining communities concerned. In short, while reforms are initiated 
with the stated aim of boosting the Congolese economy for development, 
reality on the ground seems to disprove this assumption. 
4.7. Has women’s situation changed? 
This section intends to give a fairly succinct account of the effects of 
formalization reforms on the position of women in the mines. While 
interest is growing around the formalization of the artisanal mining 
sector, little is said about the complex role of national, provincial and 
even local state actors in the changes taking place in this sector (Buss 
et al., 2019). For instance, Bashwira and Cuvelier (2019: 4) note the 
discrepancy between the official mandate of SAEMAPE and the practices 
of its employees in the field. In fact, all the departments and technical 
services of the Ministry of Mines in eastern DRC are facing the same 
structural challenges. 
As we have seen, the re-organization of mining governance includes 
the formalization process of artisanal mining, and the certification 
schemes (Bashizi and Geenen, 2015; De Haan and Geenen, 2016; Vogel 
et al., 2018; Wakenge, 2017). Approaching formalization through a 
gender lens presents a formidable challenge. Koch and Kinsbergen 
(2018) and Bashwira and Hilhorst (forthcoming) have signalled the 
change in narrative about the involvement of women in ASM in eastern 
DRC. They describe the way narratives can shift over time from overly 
protective and prohibitive to less restrictive, while recognizing that 
actors who are emphasizing particular narratives may have personal 
interests in keeping women out of the mines. 
Based on the literature review, it seems that the gendered effects of 
efforts to formalize the DRC’s ASM sector have received limited atten-
tion (but see Bashwira et al., 2014; Bashwira 2017; Buss et al., 2017). 
There is no clear evidence of changes that may have occurred and 
transformed the situation of women in mining. In the places in which the 
reforms were implemented, women are still as excluded and marginal-
ized as before. Taking iTSCi as an example, Buss (2018: 561) argues that 
this marginalization is mainly due to the policy makers’ lack of interest 
in women’s issues: ‘formalization efforts tend to exclude evidence of 
sexual violence and find irrelevant the considerations of gender issues in 
supply chain certification.’ Indeed, as mentioned in Section 3.5. above, 
the 2018 mining code does not refer to women in particular at all, expect 
in one provision that mentions the exclusion of pregnant women: ‘any 
adult of Congolese nationality, except pregnant women, who wishes to 
engage in artisanal mining exploitation throughout the national terri-
tory, can do so only within the framework of an approved mining 
cooperative [emphasis added].’24 More specific attention to women’s 
positions in the legal framework regulating the sector is thus badly 
needed. 
Today, women’s issues are still very poorly included in initiatives 
that aim at addressing conflict minerals. Neither the DRC 2018 mining 
code, the International Conference of Great Lakes Regions (ICGLR) 
regional certification mechanism, nor the “Dodd-Frank law” and other 
reforms initiatives explicitly address the participation of women in the 
mineral supply chain, though they also do not forbid it either (Masika 
2017). In reality, women actively participate in most mining activities. 
The Congolese government has always lobbied for cooperatives to be a 
“grassroots”, bottom-up form of organization. However, as we observed 
earlier, cooperatives are often dominated by a mix of customary and 
political elites, extending rather than diminishing rent-seeking practices 
(Geenen and Radley, 2014). Authors such as Buss et al. (2019) also note 
that the inability of many women’s groups to function well and to build 
a solid agenda that includes women’s causes often results in their 
absence from decision-making bodies and their lack of influence on 
policies and mining practices. This reduces their access to networks but 
also to learning about mining laws, policies, training opportunities, and 
technical improvements. In addition to their under-representation in 
miners′ cooperatives, women are also largely absent from other miners’ 
committees. 
However, this finding should be nuanced by referring to more recent 
and promising reform initiatives. These include a growing number of 
provincial and national associations of women miners which have a 
more general objective, such as the Réseau National des Femmes dans les 
Mines (or National Network of Women in Mines, RENAFEM; Bashwira 
et al., 2014; Buss et al., 2019). The aim of RENAFEM is to mobilize the 
grassroots women’s organizations by creating a vast network to improve 
women’s status and help them to gain more sustainable benefits. 
RENAFEM also promotes access to credit and small-scale savings 
schemes, as well as training and sharing information on rights and re-
sponsibilities of women in the mines (Perks 2015). While RENAFEM is 
not yet working efficiently and its objectives are not yet met, the very 
24 Journal official de la République Démocratique de Congo, Code minier. 59e 
année ; 28 mars 2018. Titre 1, Art. 5. 
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idea of a structure which could mobilize all women in the sector and be 
recognized in high-level meetings is a great motivation for many women 
at the grassroots level. A case study conducted in Nyabibwe (South Kivu) 
reports that women perceive the benefits they get from being members 
of saving associations as having a united voice, more opportunities, as 
well as protection against financial shocks (Kelly et al., 2014; for the 
results of a community-led savings and credit project in artisanal gold 
mining communities in Ituri Province, see Reichel, 2020). 
While women’s issues have thus not been addressed explicitly by the 
formalization initiatives, it is nevertheless possible to observe some 
positive effects on women miners as part of the reforms’ limited number 
of positive impacts. For example, thanks to the traceability systems, 
mining sites such as Rubaya in North Kivu were demilitarized and 
relative stability has favored the development of local trade in which 
women are actively involved (Masika, 2017). Koch and Kinsbergen 
(2018) quoting reports from IPIS, note an improvement in the interfer-
ence by armed groups around mining sites of tin, tungsten and tantalum: 
while in 2009–2010, 56 percent of the mining sites were under the in-
fluence of armed actors, this percentage decreased to 21 per cent for the 
period 2013–2014. 
However, women miners still suffer from multiple challenges in the 
ASM sector which the formalization reforms have not been able to 
change due to lack of interest and/or resources. For example, the local 
state structures and, if present, customary authorities are male domi-
nated in most mining sites. This situation is rationalized as resulting 
from the lower access of women to education, which in turn limits their 
access to public sector employment, but also results from prevalent 
gender norms (Buss et al., 2017). While women are sometimes employed 
in state offices, they are expected to do administrative jobs in the 
background, and to only undertake duties which support their male 
colleagues. In the offices of the chefferie (chiefdom administrative level), 
women are hired as cleaners, clerks, and secretaries. Most of the time, 
women working in the chefferie are part of the family of the mwami 
(traditional leader) or of the chief himself (Bashwira and Cuvelier, 
2019). 
Furthermore, women are not considered as “real miners” as they 
often do not appear on official lists given to civil servants (Buss et al., 
2019). Although on the one hand, this means that women are exempt 
from paying certain state taxes, on the other hand, it makes them even 
more vulnerable because they have to renegotiate their access to the 
mine (Bashwira and Hilhorst, forthcoming). In contrast, Rothenberg and 
Radley (2014: 42) also reported special fees (taxes) which local au-
thorities impose on all women working in the mining site (in Nzibira, 
South Kivu), ‘simply because they are said to be women.’ Men are not 
asked to pay such taxes. Women who refuse to pay these fees are brought 
to traditional authorities and sometimes even to the military for pun-
ishment. In addition, while men are working in officially recognized 
activities which provide them with legal status as workers (and ID cards 
to access the mines), women’s activities are not part of these, and hence, 
women need to negotiate their access in informal ways. It is thus no 
surprise that many women consider the impact of ASM formalization on 
their lives as negative. For example, Masika (2017) observed women’s 
negative assessment of the tagging system, as they consider it to be 
causing the drop in the mineral price, which in turn affects their liveli-
hoods negatively. However, this assessment is probably based on a 
serious lack of information on certification systems among women, as 
they do not know the mechanisms that determine mineral prices. 
In many mining places, women are only recognized as "helpers" to 
male miners by both administrative agencies and miners. Bashwira and 
Hilhorst (forthcoming) point out that local civil servants’ exercise 
discretion in granting women access to the mines. The fact that local 
actors sometimes misinterpret the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the OECD’s Duty of Due Diligence means that they may prohibit the 
presence of women in mines altogether (Bashwira et al., 2014). Indeed, 
access to mining is not just granted by local government officials, but 
also requires fulfilling formal requirements (e.g. permits) and informal 
demands by other actors such as militias and mining committees (Buss 
et al., 2017). The basis for the exclusion of women from formal mining 
operations arguably lies in the traditional legal frameworks which 
govern the ownership, access, and inheritance of land and mineral rights 
(Bashwira and Cuvelier, 2019; Bashwira and Hilhorst, forthcoming; 
Buss et al., 2017). 
In short, even though they are economically important actors in the 
sector, women miners still have limited access to the mines. They are 
mostly working without formal licenses and must navigate an environ-
ment of complex coexistence between state and non-state actors and 
regulation (Bashwira and Cuvelier, 2019; Geenen, 2011). In their quest 
for licenses along the minerals supply chain, women are sometimes 
subject to various forms of extortion (Bashwira et al., 2014; Bashwira 
and Cuvelier, 2019). To conclude, there are important (unintended) 
negative effects of the formalization process in terms of both women’s 
access to the sector, as well as their socio-economic marginalization 
within it. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this study was to generate a detailed understanding of the 
relationships between mining reforms and the Congolese state’s per-
formance in governing the extractive industry. Based on an extensive 
literature review, the study explored how mining reforms have 
increased or decreased the state’s capacity in dealing with seven (partly 
overlapping) challenges, namely: i) restricted access to and militariza-
tion of mining sites; ii) poor demarcation of mining sites; iii) disorga-
nization of diggers; iv) lack of transparency in the minerals’ trade; v) 
taxation issues; vi) lack of state accountability towards mining com-
munities and vii) the precarious inclusion or exclusion of women from 
mining activities. These challenges were thoroughly examined for both 
the pre- and post-reform periods. 
The major finding of this study is that the reforms had mixed results 
in the seven areas of intervention identified by the authors. For instance, 
although the reforms have contributed to demarcate artisanal mining 
zones; have increased state’s revenues or encouraged new institutional 
framework through the creation of mining cooperatives, state account-
ability and the social impacts of these measures remain limited. By 
reporting the findings for each of the three selected provinces, the study 
shows that mining reform initiatives create a mix of different patterns of 
governance depending on the geographical area (Diemel and Cuvelier, 
2015; Vogel, 2018). For instance in Tanganyika where only a few armed 
groups were reported during the study period, the reforms succeeded in 
this province because there was relative peace. In addition, given the 
exclusive monopoly of MMR/CDMC in trading minerals, transparency of 
the 3T supply-chain has relatively improved there, compared to North 
and South-Kivu where armed groups interfere in the mining business. 
The literature review highlights some issues of concern that need to 
be addressed. First, even though the implementation of the conflict 
mineral policy has left its mark on 3T mining governance and has 
redefined the state’s role therein, the mining reforms have not brought 
peace. Second, the literature review shows that the mining reforms have 
had limited effects on the state’s performance in governing the sector. 
For instance, the state has increased its capacity in generating revenues 
from mining activities. The redistribution of these revenues to state 
agents and to the mining communities remains a huge challenge, how-
ever. Third, although a significant number of mining cooperatives have 
been established, these structures are less inclusive of ordinary miners. 
The state has done little to financially and technically support these 
structures, putting them at risk of being captured by powerful elites. In 
short, it seems that the reforms were not fully implemented but stopped 
half-way. They address some issues and leave others lagging behind. 
Another crucial issue of concern is the strengthening of state pres-
ence at artisanal mines. In this regard, the literature review found some 
variation between the provinces. Compared to the war-torn provinces of 
North-Kivu and South-Kivu, state agents are present at many artisanal 
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mines of Tanganyika where mining reform is operational. The major 
reason explaining this variation is the relatively more peaceful character 
of Tanganyika, with less armed groups than the Kivus (Congo Research 
Group, 2019; Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015: 155). In the Kivus, the pres-
ence of armed actors renders the full control of mining activities by state 
agents difficult. In many areas, the absence of state agents provides 
opportunities to non-state actors (especially armed groups) to benefit 
from mining activities. However, the literature review also demonstrates 
that extending the state’s involvement does not necessarily mean that 
governance practices have improved. In some areas, under-paid state 
officials or FARDC soldiers are confronting artisanal miners with new 
forms of taxation and extortion practices. In short, the precise impact of 
mining formalization on the everyday lives of people, i.e. miners and 
their families, traders, state agents and women in particular, is not yet 
known. 
We believe that this study provides a useful starting point for further 
research on the challenges it reviewed. In addition, we hope that it will 
serve as a source of inspiration for policymakers seeking to improve the 
governance and transparency of the Congolese mining sector, which 
could ultimately help to promote a more equitable redistribution of its 
revenues for the benefit of the Congolese population as a whole. 
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